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   As a species, humans paradoxically posses the strong drive to seek out the 
company and comfort of our own kind, while also showing some predilection for 
victimizing, exploiting, and harming each other. This predilection has been and 
remains an area of concern. Our attempts to address this fundamental concern have 
taken two broad and basic tracks. First, social institutions have evolved for the 
purposes of identifying and dealing with those individuals who would harm their 
group mates. We have come to refer to (at least part of) these institutions as the 
criminal justice system (CJS). Second, for over two hundred years, we have been 
formally and consistently engaged in trying to decipher, through theory and 
research, our criminal/deviant side. This we have come to call criminology. These 
two domains of reactions are part-and-parcel of a larger process; they are two facets 
of the same human endeavor.  The focus of this analysis is most directly on the 
second facet of our efforts to address this intractable human foible, theory and 
research. However, in the realm of criminality and deviance it is not fully possible 
(and certainly not desirable) to address one of these facets without some attention 
to the other.    
Criminology and the Conceptualization of Crime/Criminals 
  Given its own eclectic etiological roots and the broad and diverse nature of its 
focus, criminology is, by necessity and pedigree, highly interdisciplinary in nature, 
drawing from a wide array of disciplines. Because of this strong interdisciplinary 
character, our conceptualizations of crime and criminals can vary substantially and 
cover considerable theoretical terrain, and this gets to the crux of the current 
analysis. How crime and criminals are conceptualized is an essential and foundational 
consideration in criminology. The conceptualization adopted underlies the theories 
that are developed, determines the methods of data collection, and thereby 
influences and informs the policies for addressing crime that are supported and 
promoted.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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  This latter area of influence relates directly to the strong connections between 
criminology and criminal justice and warrants some further comment. Criminal 
justice refers, primarily, to the agencies of social control which are charged with 
implementing and enforcing the law and dealing with those who violate it. 
Criminology and criminal justice, to a great extent, are two sides of the same coin; 
they are, at the same time, interdependent and independent disciplines and 
institutions. On the academic/scientific side, we must have knowledge of the 
practical and functional aspects of the CJS to develop grounded theories. By the 
same token, system practitioners rely on the academic side for theory and research 
to help guide and inform policy and practice. In this interactive process, there is 
conceptual overlap, but also conceptual independence, and even some conflict. Also, 
it is important to note that it is this intricate relationship that ups the ante when we 
think about the functions and impact of criminological theories. “Virtually every 
policy or action taken regarding crime is based on some underlying theory or 
theories of crime (i.e., on conceptualizations). It is essential, therefore, to 
comprehend and evaluate the major theories of criminology, not only for the 
academic or research criminologist, but also for the educated citizen and the legal or 
criminal justice professional” (Akers, 1997, p.2, parenthetical added). 
  Akers (1997) is not alone in acknowledging the strong and essential 
connection between theory/research and policy/practice (see also Holdaway & Rock, 
1998; Lanier & Henry, 1998; Lilly, Cullen & Ball, 1995; Pfohl, 1985; Vold, Bernard, & 
Snipes, 1998; Hashimoto, 2011;). 
  Given the foundational role of theory and its intimate connection with policy, 
it is widely agreed that it is imperative that we test our theories (Babbie, 2008; 
Birks, Townsley & Stewart, 2012; Holdaway & Rock, 1998; Kreager, Rulison, & 
Moody, 2011; Van de Rakt, Ruiter, De Graaf, & Nieuwbeerta, 2010). It is crucial that 
we (accurately) assess how well they are serving us as guides or maps to the real Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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world, and that we also assess their utility in helping to construct viable and 
functional policies and practices.  
  In order to test our theories (and also to evaluate our policies and practices), 
we must translate the elements from the theory into injunctions or “measurement” 
processes. We must translate our conceptualizations into operationalizations 
(hopefully without losing too much in the translation). The main purpose of the 
analysis presented here is to explore the relationship between conceptualization and 
operationalization. Before we can begin to delve into this central relationship we 
need to fully define what we mean by conceptualization and operationalization; in 
other words we need to define our “concepts.” 
Conceptualization 
  Let us begin by noting that, despite the frequency with which the word 
conceptualization is used, it is not very often directly defined. Concept, on the other 
hand, is defined all over the place. Generally, concepts may be viewed as qualitative, 
global notions that characterize some element(s) of reality. When we pull together a 
group of concepts that can be logically related, we might then call that a theory, 
which brings us to conceptualization. Babbie (1989) defines conceptualization as the 
mental process whereby fuzzy and imprecise notions (concepts) are made more 
specific and detailed, the process through which we specify precisely what we mean 
when we use a particular term. He further notes that the end product of 
conceptualization is a set of indicators. So, for Babbie, part of the process of 
conceptualizing is a sorting out of the kinds of observations/measurements that will 
be appropriate in our research.  
  Senese (1997) sees conceptualization as the second stage of research design 
(after idea formulation). It is the process of refining research ideas into specific 
terms and the beginning of your own interpretation and approach to the study. 
Conceptualization focuses the research design on specific concepts or ideas to be the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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subject/object of study. The conceptualization of the research issue or question 
indicates the concepts to be used, or the conceptual basis for the study, and 
represents a set of basic expectations about what you believe you will find. 
Conceptualization also provides an explanation of these general expectations. 
  To summarize, conceptualization is the construct that we use to describe the 
varied things that go on in the process of translating concepts into theories and then 
especially into research. It is what we think about and do with concepts. It is the 
mental framework we construct with and about a set of related concepts. We use 
these frameworks for constructing meaning in and about our world. From the 
standpoint of social science, our conceptualizations of phenomena, issues, problems, 
etc. become the bases for our theories, our research, and ultimately for our policies 
and practices.  
  Babbie (1989) noted that the end point of conceptualizing is the development 
of a set of indicators. A key aspect of conceptualization is linking a mental 
representation of a phenomenon (i.e. a concept or conceptual definition) with ways 
to compare that representation to reality. Conceptualization ultimately leads to the 
development or identifying of injunctions/exemplars/paradigms (Babbie, 1989). Most 
certainly conceptualization entails developing theories about how the world works. 
But the hallmark of science is to then test those representations against the real 
world, to assess the veracity of our theories, and thereby establish their utility and 
functionality. Consequently, a vital issue becomes, “how do we operationalize our 
concepts?” We must ask honestly of ourselves “How fully are we able to measure or 
assess what we have conceptualized?” “To what extent do our injunctions match our 
concepts?” We must also be willing to explore the implications for gaps in this 
process. “What does it mean when there is a disjuncture between our 
concepts/conceptual definitions and our injunctions?”  
Operationalization Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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  “Whereas conceptualization concerns the intellectual clarification of concepts 
for measurement, operationalization is the construction of actual, concrete 
measurement techniques” (Babbie, 1989, p. 5, italics in original).  Senese (1997) 
defines operationalization as “the process of defining variables” that represent  
“specific concepts or portions thereof.” More importantly he reminds us that “[W]hen 
researchers operationalize they impose their ideas about how the concept should be 
measured on the study situation” (p. 381, italics not in original). 
  Operationalization then is the development of measurable representations of 
concepts and/or dimensions of concepts (i.e., variables). It is the development of 
specific research procedures/operations/measures that will result in empirical 
observations/data representing the abstract concepts of interest in the study. 
Operationalization is the process of putting the concepts of interest into operation or 
of operating on those concepts in order to “measure” them, both individually and/or 
in relation to other concepts. It is the process that permits us to compare our 
conceptual definitions to “reality.” It produces the data upon which we base theory 
refinement/modification, theory verification or refutation, and ultimately policy and 
practice. The importance of this step in the research process cannot be 
overestimated as it yields the final versions, so to speak, of what our concepts are 
thought to look like, how they are thought to act and function, and to a great extent 
what we are to do with or about them. It would seem to be sine qua non that we are 
meticulous about the translation of concepts, through conceptual and then 
operational definitions.  
Slippage and Construct Validity 
  Construct validity, as typically defined, refers to the degree to which 
inferences can legitimately/validly be made about theoretical constructs/concepts 
from the operationalizations of those constructs. It “involves making inferences from 
the sampling particulars of a study to the higher-order constructs they represent” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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(Shadish et al., 2002, p. 65).  “Construct validity refers to the adequacy of the 
operational definition and measurement of the theoretical constructs...” in question 
(Farrington, 2003). Put more simply, construct validity refers to the extent to which 
we are measuring what we think (and claim) that we are measuring; it refers directly 
to the translation of conceptual definitions into operational definitions.  
  Shadish et al. (2002, p. 65) note that there are three reasons why construct 
validity is important: 1) Constructs
1 constitute the “central means” for connecting 
the operations in a study to “pertinent theory and to language communities.” 2) 
Construct labels can and often do carry social, political, and economic implications. 
“They shape perceptions, frame debates, and elicit support and criticism.” 3) The 
“creation and defense of basic constructs is a fundamental task of all science.”  
  All constructs have multiple features. The more central features are identified 
as being prototypical of the construct. However, what is prototypical depends on the 
“particular language community” doing the choosing (Shadish et al., 2002). 
Identifying prototypical features is an essential aspect of translating concepts into 
operations. Given the various difficulties with establishing prototypical features for 
our concepts “… it is never possible to establish a one-to-one relationship between 
the operations of a study and corresponding constructs” (Shadish et al., 2002, p.68); 
there is always some “slippage” (i.e., some gap between the concept that has been 
conceptualized and the measures of that concept). It seems then that a major focus 
in our research should be to minimize this slippage as much as possible. 
  Anything that potentially increases slippage can be considered as a threat to 
construct validity. Shadish et al. (2002) list fourteen such threats. For the purposes 
of this analysis, there are three threats that are particularly salient and that should 
serve to illuminate our concerns and points: 1) mono-operation bias – any one 
                                                 
1 Shadish et al. (2002, p. 506) define construct as “a concept, model, or schematic idea. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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operationalization of a construct will both under represent the construct of interest 
(i.e., will not address all of the relevant dimensions and/or all of the prototypical 
features) and also will include some measurement of irrelevant constructs; 2) mono-
method bias – when all operations use the same method that method is actually a 
part of the construct studied (i.e., the method itself may influence results); and, 3) 
confounding constructs with levels of constructs – inferences about constructs that 
are best represented with the operations in the study may not delineate the 
restricted levels (or dimensions) of the construct that were actually operationalized.  
  As noted above, it would seem that as the goal of research is to be able to 
draw valid inferences from our operations about the concepts of interest, we need to 
do everything we can to reduce slippage/to control for construct validity threats. The 
first step in enhancing construct validity is to fully explicate the construct/concept. 
However, as noted by Shadish et al. (2002), this is only half of the battle. No matter 
how well a construct is explicated, in order to study it, it has to be translated into 
operations. It is here that we must become concerned about slippage. Farrington 
(2003) reminds us that this issue is particularly salient in our discipline when he 
notes that “[W]hereas the operational definition and measurement of physical 
constructs such as height and weight are not contentious, this is not true of most 
criminological constructs” (p. 54). 
  We need to fully acknowledge the multi-dimensional nature of our constructs 
and endeavor to address as many dimensions as possible through our operations. 
This means that we need to employ multiple operations/measures of our constructs, 
for both independent and dependent variables. We also need to acknowledge 
explicitly and overtly the limitations of our measures and not fall victim to 
confounding constructs with levels of constructs. There has been some 
acknowledgement of these issues with the more recent calls for multi-methodological Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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or mixed methodological approaches (see for example Creswell, J. W. & Plano Clark, 
V. L., 2007; Brewer, 2005; Johnson & Christensen, 2004; Creswell, 2002).  
  Despite the growing level of interest in mixed method approaches, a lot of 
work still remains in terms of philosophical positions, designs, analysis, etc. 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006). To more fully address the issues of construct validity and 
slippage, we will require a broader and deeper view of what constitutes legitimate 
methodology, and the movement toward mixed methods is definitely a step in the 
right direction. However, as noted, there is still much to be done to more fully 
develop these approaches. We will revisit these issues below when we discuss the 
causes of slippage and also in the section on alternative methodologies.  
From Conceptual to Operational Definitions in Criminological Research: An 
Assessment of Concordance  
 
  Despite the pivotal role of translating conceptual definitions into operational 
ones, there seems to be very little real attention devoted to careful monitoring or 
assessment of the relationship between concepts and measures. This lack of 
attention applies to dependent and independent variables alike. There is much said 
in the literature about the process of measurement itself and about constructing 
specific measures, which is most often presented under the guise of 
operationalization or operational definitions. However, this discussion focuses on a 
very narrow range of elements and has historically promoted an extremely limiting 
view about what valid measurement is and can be; thereby severely restricting the 
dialog on what it means to move from concept to operational definition.  Cohen 
(2009) conducted an in-depth analysis to examine the concordance between 
conceptual and operational definitions of gender in criminological research, as well as 
in some other social sciences. The analysis and results are briefly presented below to 
provide an illustration of the slippage that often does occur when we move from 
concepts to operations.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
January, 2013, Vol 5 (1): 1-38    Martin, Cohen, Champion 
  
10 
 
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Gender in Criminological Literature: The 
Problem of Construct Validity 
As discussed above, an important step in the process of bolstering construct 
validity is to fully explicate the prototypical elements of any construct (Shadish et al., 
2002).   To this end, Wilber’s (2000a) Integral AQAL model offers one possible 
framework. According to Wilber’s AQAL model, all human phenomena have four 
distinct, yet interrelated quadrants. These quadrants are the interior individual, 
interior collective, exterior individual, and exterior collective (see Wilber, 2000a; 
2000b; 2000c).  
One interpretation of these quadrants is as dimensions of human experience 
(quadrant-dimensions). The interior individual quadrant-dimension corresponds to 
individuals’ subjective experiences such as thoughts, emotions, attitudes, and 
beliefs. The interior collective quadrant-dimension corresponds to inter-subjective 
experiences such as shared meaning, mutual resonance, and culture. The exterior 
individual quadrant-dimension corresponds to objective experiences such as 
behavior, biology, and physiology. Finally, the exterior collective quadrant-dimension 
corresponds to inter-objective experiences such as the functional fit of parts within a 
social system and modes of interaction. 
A second interpretation of the quadrants is as the four primordial perspectives 
that we can adopt when looking at a particular phenomenon (quadrant-
perspectives). In other words, at any given point in time we are able to both feel into 
all four quadrant-dimensions as aspects of our lived reality, as well as take on all 
four quadrant-perspectives as analytic lenses. Further, our ability to “see” each 
quadrant-dimension depends on the application of a distinct “eye” or quadrant-
perspective.  
To state this within the language of scientific research, the four quadrant-
dimensions correspond to the prototypical elements of a construct, which generate Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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conceptual definitions at particular points in time, for particular language 
communities (e.g., disciplines). Further, the four quadrant-perspectives correspond 
to the ways we can “see” or enact each quadrant-dimension, generating a set of 
appropriate operational definitions. And, perhaps more important for our discussion 
here, one must insure that claims made regarding each of the prototypical elements 
emerge from research in which appropriately corresponding conceptual and 
operational  definitions are enacted.  
To help illustrate these points, and support our overarching position that 
criminology is in need of a meta-theoretical framework that will reduce slippage and, 
therefore, enhance our ability to remain truthful in our advertising, we briefly present 
findings from a study of the treatment of gender as a construct in criminological 
research (Cohen, 2009). The methodological context of the broader study from 
which the findings reported here come is a content analysis of 851 peer-reviewed 
journal articles published in criminology, sociology, and psychology. While the 
current presentation focuses on the criminological literature (138 articles), the 
findings were relatively consistent across all three disciplines included the original 
analysis.  
  The four-quadrant framework of the AQAL model described above was used 
to create the coding scheme employed in the analysis (see Table 1). The quadrants 
as dimensions were employed to identify and categorize ways in which the 
prototypical elements of gender have been conceptually defined, while the quadrants 
as perspectives were employed to identify and categorize the ways in which the 
prototypical elements have been operationally defined.
2  
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
                                                 
2 The claim that Integral Theory offers an adequate framework for identifying prototypical elements is 
supported by an analysis in which the quadrant-dimensions were shown to cover the wide range of 
scholarly treatments of gender that have emerged in the academic and scientific literature (see Cohen, 
2008; 2009). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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   The sample definitions in Table 1 represent instances in which the researchers 
employed appropriate operational definitions to measure their conceptual definitions. 
For example, in their study of women involved in violent crime, Kruttschnitt and 
Carbone-Lopez (2006) included concepts such as women’s “identities as partners or 
mothers” and “perceived threats to their status as a good mother or a faithful 
partner” (p. 344). In order to measure these gender-identity related conceptual 
definitions, these researchers employed in-depth interviews. During these interviews, 
the women who participated in their study were able to describe their gender-
identities and perceived threats to those identities in their own words, from their own 
perspectives.  
Notice that these researchers included conceptual definitions of gender 
oriented towards an individual’s subjective experience as a gendered-being—the 
interior individual quadrant-dimension. Equally important, these researchers 
employed an operationalization appropriately designed to enact the corresponding 
interior individual quadrant-perspective. In-depth interviews, as a method, allow 
participants to enact their understanding of themselves as gendered-beings directly. 
  In contrast, Miller’s (2007) study of criminal events offers an illustration of 
how even the most well-intentioned and well-informed researchers can fall prey to 
slippage. Miller clearly understands the complexity of gender as a lived experience 
and the need, therefore, to develop more inclusive and nuanced conceptual 
definitions. Moreover, Miller identifies gender as an important variable: “the primary 
independent variables, offender gender and the involvement of co-offenders, were 
central to the research objective of examining how gender as a social practice is 
intertwined with offending” (p. 211; emphasis added). It is no surprise that someone 
so well versed in the literature on gender (citing multiple theories of gender and 
drawing extensively from the feminist literature) would construct a conceptualization 
that attempts to capture the complexity of gender as a lived experience and practice. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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Unfortunately, the complexity of this conceptualization of gender is not reflected in 
the operationalization employed in Miller’s study. 
In an interesting (and not all too uncommon) maneuvering, Miller (2007) 
presents the operationalization of gender in the following terms: “the gender variable 
is actually more accurately called sex and was coded as a dummy variable with male 
treated as the reference category” (p. 211). In an endnote, Miller admits that, “this 
operationalization of gender is simply a dualistic measure of sex” (p. 220). So, while 
recognizing the conceptual complexity of gender as a social practice and openly 
admitting the limitations of the “add sex and stir approach,” Miller still relies on this 
approach in the analysis. In recognizing this sleight-of-hand, Miller states, “the 
constant construction of identity that describes the process of gender is artificially 
suspended to fit it within the constraints of conventional deductive analyses” (p. 
221; emphasis added). 
So for those who are following along, Miller recognizes (conceptually) that 
gender is a social practice that involves the fluid and continuous construction of 
identity by an individual (interior-individual quadrant-dimension) in relation to 
collective constructions (interior-collective quadrant-dimension) that are not 
necessarily reflected in a dichotomized view of sex (exterior-individual quadrant-
dimension); however, if we want to continue to employ those types of operational 
approaches that are valued by our discipline (e.g., complex statistical analyses), we 
must “artificially suspend” the lived experiences of those we study and adopt proxy 
measures that we know do not fully represent those experiences.  
In the overall analysis, roughly 11% of the 138 articles published in 
criminology and criminal justice journals included in the study sample employed 
operational definitions that did not match their conceptualizations of gender (i.e., 
had issues with slippage). If we remove those articles that did not include definitions 
of gender, the rate of slippage increases to 15%. Interestingly, higher rates of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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slippage were found in those journals specifically focused on gender (21%) than the 
more mainstream journals (12%). It appears that while researchers sensitive to the 
complexity of gender are recognizing a wider range of conceptual definitions, they 
are still adhering to a limited range of operationalizations and methods.
3 
While gender provides one illustration of the problem of slippage, it is 
certainly reasonable to conclude that we might well find similar situations with other 
concepts and measures, such as race, socioeconomic status, recidivism, criminality, 
and even crime itself, just to name a few. This conclusion is based, at least in part, 
on what we believe to be one of the dominant contributing factors to the problem of 
slippage, the narrow and shallow approach to science and methodology that 
predominates in criminology (and across the social sciences).  
The Causes/Sources of Slippage 
Williams (1999) observes that “[P]erhaps due in part to greater emphasis on 
methodological sophistication than on understanding theory, many researchers 
simply approximate theoretical concepts with variables that are handy in the 
secondary data that they use” (p. 70). With this observation, Williams has identified 
at least three factors that can contribute to slippage in criminological (and other) 
research.  
The first factor relates to what has been identified as an “overweening 
emphasis on quantitative, statistical analysis and the strong tendency toward 
disciplinary reductionism” (Williams, 1999, p. 75). Criminology has “…followed the 
‘hard’ sciences into an alley where we are more concerned with measurement itself” 
than with the substance of that being measured (p. 97). Martin et al. (2004) 
identified three central criticisms of criminology from the literature, one being that 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that assessing the problem of slippage does not address the issue of whether those 
studies/articles that did not indicate slippage are adequately defining and then measuring the concepts at 
hand. The assessment only addresses the extent to which the operational definition/measurement process 
matches the conceptual definition offered. In other words the issue of adequate/inadequate explication of 
constructs is not addressed. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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criminology is too narrow and too empirical (see also Martin, 2006). Christie (1997) 
attributes what he calls the “triviality of our findings” to “over socialization to 
expectations created by science” (p. 13). The core concern is that we are allowing 
the methodological tools to overshadow their own purpose. In other words, we are 
allowing the method to define the concept; we are forcing all of the pegs, regardless 
of shape, into the same round hole. Williams (1999) refers to this as the “meta-
paradigm of quantitative methodology” and observes that overemphasizing one 
approach actually constitutes a general threat to knowledge.  
A second and closely related factor is the ever-increasing reliance on 
secondary data (see Jasinski, 2004; Mroczeket al., 2011). We end up defining our 
concepts based on data that already exist, rather than developing 
injunctions/operations tailored by the concepts in question. As sometimes these are 
official data, there is the added issue of having political and other organizational 
agendas define our concepts and/or operational definitions. These data sets have 
been developed to meet the needs of various political/social entities, and as Rappert 
(1997, p. 239) aptly notes “the incorporation of users’ needs in social science 
research” can create serious problems and has important ramifications for the future 
of such research. (We will touch more on this issue under another source of slippage 
discussed below.)  
Third, Shadish et al. (2002) list inadequate explication of constructs as a 
threat to construct validity. If we are emphasizing methods and measurement over 
theory, the focus shifts to operational as opposed to conceptual definition, and as 
discussed above, method comes to define concepts rather than conceptualization 
helping to guide methods. If we add into this equation a narrow focus on what 
constitutes acceptable/legitimate methods, the potential for slippage increases even 
more. This helps create a situation where theories that are derived from “empirical” 
evidence “...may never come close to representing reality” (Williams, 1999, p. 97). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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  We will briefly note one other source for slippage. A recurrent concern 
expressed in the literature is that criminology is too closely associated with criminal 
justice (Martin et al., 2004). The trepidation over the seemingly tense wedding of 
criminology and criminal justice is pertinent to our discussion of slippage for several 
reasons. It relates to the issues raised above about narrow/shallow methodologies, 
as well as the concerns about incorporating users’ needs into the scientific process. 
The methodologies most well suited for addressing more specific applied research or 
policy type questions are not necessarily the best methodologies for addressing more 
basic research questions or testing theory. Conceptual and/or operational definitions 
developed in applied research may well not reflect all of the aspects of the complex 
constructs that more deeply underlie the policies and practices and that make up the 
foundational theories of crime and criminality. For example, the official statistics on 
the distribution of crime by sex may help departments of corrections determine 
resource allocations, but they cannot address gender as an explanatory construct in 
the etiology of crime, or as a factor in the organizational climates of criminal justice 
agencies. 
Also, this relationship gets back into the area of overlapping language 
communities, which refer to different domains that have concepts in common. In 
such cases, the concept is defined differently in the various domains, and it can be 
problematic to subsume one definition under another. To do so constitutes an 
element of slippage and creates challenges to construct validity. Identifying a 
person’s biological sex with one simple question certainly does capture an element of 
the concept of gender, but it does not remotely capture the full depth and breadth of 
the construct. For a department of corrections, the “problem” of gender may well be 
one of allocating resources by sex, but for a social worker or clinical psychologist the 
issue of gender takes on whole other meanings, and is in reality another set of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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issues. Not recognizing this multiplicity of existence and enactment of our concepts, 
to us, constitutes a form of slippage. 
The Consequences of Slippage  
  Before we get into a brief discussion of alternative methodological 
frameworks, it is important that we first address some of the repercussions of 
slippage.   In The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen J. Gould (1981) provides a 
compelling and dramatic (recurring) illustration of the negative and destructive 
impacts that can occur when operationalizations are inadequate to capture the 
complexity of constructs. Gould describes the history of measuring human 
intelligence and outcomes that have been related to the measurement process and 
the resultant data/findings. From early operationalizations where brain size (which 
was equated with intelligence) was measured by filling skulls with flax seeds and 
weighing them, all the way up through modern era intelligence testing, inadequate 
operational definitions of intelligence have served as the basis of or at least support 
for discriminatory and harmful policies and practices. The early studies helped 
provide the justifications for Great Britain’s colonization policies and the oppressive 
and discriminatory practices often employed in that process. More modern 
intelligence tests and “scholarly” works such as The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 
1994) have assisted in promoting views of racial/ethnic disparity and thereby 
supported and fostered discriminatory stereotypes. These stereotypes help form the 
foundation for racial and ethnic bias and prejudice which, in turn, has contributed to 
a wide range of discriminatory practices and policies, from slavery, to unfair hiring, 
to current perceptions of criminality. 
This dramatic, pervasive, and long running example of the caustic impact that 
can result from slippage serves to highlight again the essential nature of the 
connections among research and policy/practice/perception. There can be no debate 
that we (most especially in Western cultures) value science as a (if not the) principal Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
January, 2013, Vol 5 (1): 1-38    Martin, Cohen, Champion 
  
18 
 
source for information about our world and that we look to science to inform our 
decisions, policies, and practices. Also, science greatly helps to shape our cultural 
view of the world and how it and its inhabitants function.  
There has been much written, across disciplines, about the link between 
theory and practice/policy, and this link is of course mediated by the connections 
between theory and research. In addition to the theory, research, policy 
interconnections, there also are the more direct connections between 
practice/policy/programs and research, in the form of evaluation and outcome type 
research. Also, there is the entire realm of “applied” research in which we endeavor, 
through the methods of science, to address real world issues, to arrive at solutions to 
real problems. In all of these instances, the research, regardless of form, rests on a 
foundation of constructs, which must be operationalized to test the theory, evaluate 
the program, and/or solve the problem. If things get lost or altered in the translation 
from theory/construct to research/operational definition, then the data generated will 
not fully represent the construct in question. In turn, the data cannot fully inform 
policy or practice. At best, the data may lead to ineffective policies or ineffectual 
solutions, but in many cases, as illustrated above, the impact can be more negative 
and destructive.  
There are numerous criminological examples of problems resulting from 
slippage, but for the purposes at hand we will look at one enduring and broadly 
applicable illustration. As our system of punishment rests on deterrence theory, 
assessments of the effectiveness of our policies and practices therefore utilize 
deterrence as the outcome variable. It would seem safe to conclude that there is, 
more often than not, considerable slippage between the construct of deterrence as 
traditionally defined and the ways in which it is most often operationalized. 
Deterrence (specific deterrence, to be precise) has generally been defined as the 
process of discouraging individual criminal defendants from becoming repeat Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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offenders specifically and discouraging others in society from engaging in criminal 
activity generally. Looking at specific deterrence, what is in question is the future 
performance of the same or similar behaviors for which a given individual has 
already been punished. The operational definitions of the dependent variable that are 
often employed are re-arrest or re-conviction, both of which create conservative 
estimates of the actual level of re-offending, and thereby overestimates of the 
impact of our selected versions of punishment as a deterrent. It seems feasible that 
specific policies such as three strikes laws and also more broad approaches like the 
multiple wars on drugs may in part be attributable to mis-measures of the deterrent 
impact of punishment generally and incarceration more specifically. (Deterrence 
theory also provides an example of inadequate explication of constructs in that 
conceptualizations of the decision making process involved are often rather 
oversimplified.) 
To conclude this section, if we will allow that there is a somewhat pervasive 
problem with slippage and that this problem does carry real world implications and 
dangers, then the next issue becomes what can be done to address this risky and 
challenging state of affairs. We (and others as cited above) believe that this problem 
is in very large part rooted in our current, limited view of what constitutes 
appropriate research/science. If this is so, the solution then rests with developing 
and adopting deeper and broader models of science and research that can support 
more fully explicated constructs and that will provide methodologies sufficiently 
complex and complete to more adequately “measure” these constructs.    
Deep Science, Alternative Methodological Models, and Construct Validity  
Robert McGrath (2005) begins his article “Conceptual Complexity and 
Construct Validity” with the following observation: 
Despite a century of methodological and conceptual advances in the 
technology of psychosocial measurement, poor correspondence between 
indicators and the constructs they are intended to represent remains a Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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limiting factor to the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Longstanding 
conventions in measurement may contribute to the failure to develop optimal 
criteria. (p. 112) 
 
While McGrath is examining this issue within the context of personality assessment, 
the fundamental points are equally applicable in criminological research. In fact, 
Walker (2007) offers a similar indictment of criminology specifically when he notes 
that “[F]or over a century, criminological research has been able to explain a 
consistently small amount of the variation in crime. It is plausible that the problem 
with criminological theory is not in the theory but in the analysis” (p. 555).  
   With a few minor incursions, the prevailing view of science and methodology 
has been and is decidedly a modernist view. A number of authors (see for example 
Quinney, 1991; Martin, 1993, 2000, 2006; Martin et al., 2004; Williams, 1984, 
1999; Gibbs, Giever, & Pober, 2000; Braswell & Gold, 2008) have claimed that this 
prevailing modernist bent has mired criminology in very narrow and incomplete 
views of the world.  A common theme permeating these works is that this myopic 
vision of the world is attributable to the discipline's deep entrenchment in modern 
science, which has been referred to as “flatland” or the “disaster of modernity” 
(Wilber, 1998, 2000a, 2000c).  Without getting into a lengthy discussion, this 
conceptualization basically refers to the collapsing of the interiors into exteriors, 
thereby creating a flattened view of reality and the world, a world of only surfaces 
and matter. In the Modern era, scientific materialism came to be seen, not as one of 
the ways of knowing, but as the only valid way.  From this perspective, matter and 
body, but also soul and spirit, can be “thoroughly and rudely reduced to systems of 
matter alone…matter would account for all of reality, without remainder” (Wilber, 
1998, p. 13).    
Let us be clear, this commentary is not intended to be a general indictment of 
science as a way of knowing (nor certainly as a condemnation of evil against 
scientists). Science constitutes an important domain of knowledge, and it is an Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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important part of how we apprehend the world. Science itself is not the problem; the 
problem is the narrow and shallow view of science that we have adopted and 
continue to practice. In Fritjof Capra’s (1983) widely cited book, The Turning Point, 
he cautions that a science based solely on measurement and concerned only with 
quantity is inherently unable to accommodate experience, quality, or values. Over-
reliance on narrow empiricism creates a “tautological position” in which knowledge 
comes to be equated primarily (if not exclusively) with that which is measured 
(Williams, 1984). Even in their seminal work on construct validity, Cronbach and 
Meehl (1955) noted that “[T]he integration of diverse data into a proper 
interpretation cannot be an entirely quantitative process” (p. 300).              
Of course, movement too far in the opposite direction would be equally 
problematic. In other words, while an exaggerated reliance on quantitative (i.e., 
surface/exterior) methods of inquiry represents a myopic and reductionist approach, 
so too would an exaggerated reliance on qualitative (i.e., depth/interior) methods of 
inquiry. The goal is to develop and adopt meta-frameworks that allow for the 
inclusion of a wider range of methods, in order to more completely explicate our 
constructs, more authentically align our operations with those constructs, and, 
ultimately, be more capable of enacting the full complexity of our theoretical models 
in order to more genuinely inform criminal justice practice and policy.  
  To this end, we now move to a brief discussion of some meta-frameworks 
that are currently challenging the widespread reductionism found in criminology and 
other disciplines. One of these meta-frameworks was described earlier in relation to 
research on the study of gender in criminological literature. As was described above, 
the four quadrant-dimensions of the AQAL model provide the context of identifying 
the prototypical elements of our constructs. Simultaneously, the four quadrant-
perspectives provide the context for identifying and engaging appropriate methods in 
order to enact each of those prototypical elements. The AQAL model, therefore, can Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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help to both identify slippage in existing research (as exemplified in the analysis of 
research on gender discussed earlier) and prevent slippage in future research.  
In an explication of the philosophical underpinnings of the AQAL model, 
Wilber (2006a; 2006b) introduced Integral Methodological Pluralism (IMP). Through 
IMP, Wilber recognized that each quadrant-dimension could be viewed from either 
the inside or the outside. For instance, we can view the interior-individual dimension 
from the inside, via some form of phenomenological inquiry, or from the outside, via 
some form of psycho-structural analysis. Through this distinction between inside and 
outside views, Wilber constructed 8 hori-zones representing the inside and outside 
view of each of the four quadrants (see Figure 1).  
According to Wilber, 
We inhabit these 8 spaces, these zones, these lifeworlds, as 
practical realities. Each of these zones is not just a perspective, but an 
action, an injunction, a concrete set of actions in a real world zone. 
Each injunction brings forth or discloses the phenomena that are 
apprehended through the various perspectives. (2006b, p. 35) 
 
Each zone is also tied to a particular methodological family. It is important to 
note that these methodological families are presented as “placeholders” for a wide 
range of methods/injunctions designed to enact or bring forth phenomena associated 
with each of the zones of IMP. For instance, phenomenology as the study of one’s 
own interiors can be engaged with injunctions ranging from introspective journaling 
to transcendental  
 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
    
 
 
   
   
Individual 
Exterior  Interior 
Zone 1 
Inside 
Phenomenology 
Zone 2 
Outside 
Structuralism 
     Zone 5 
     Inside 
Cognitive Sciences 
Zone 6 
Outside 
Empiricism Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
January, 2013, Vol 5 (1): 1-38    Martin, Cohen, Champion 
  
23 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 8 Zones of Integral Methodological Pluralism 
meditation. In each instance, the steps of the process may be different, but in all 
instances the goal is to enact or bring forth an inside view of your own interior-
individual worldspace. 
Three additional principles sit at the foundation of IMP and are relevant for 
our discussion of slippage. These are nonexclusion -the notion that each 
injunction/paradigm/practice can generate truth claims and valid knowledge, and 
therefore must be honored for its particular contribution; enfoldment -the notion that 
some practices/injunctions offer a more complete set of truth claims than others; 
and, enactment -the notion that all researchers bring forth the worlds that they are 
studying because all researchers are operating from particular ontological and 
epistemological positions (see Wilber, 2006b; Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006). Each of these 
principles has implications for our understanding of science and our ability to shift 
from the current “narrow” or “shallow” science that sits at the center of the 
criminological endeavor to a more “deep” science that would help address many of 
the causes of slippage identified above.  
Combined, these principles suggest that: 1) each injunction or method of 
inquiry offers a particular set of truth claims; 2) the relative validity of the truth 
claims generated from any particular injunction can only be evaluated in relation to 
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the validity tests associated with the paradigms within which those injunctions are 
situated; 3) researchers who engage a particular injunction cannot make claims 
regarding the relative validity of truth claims generated through a different 
injunction; 4) researchers must recognize the limitations of their own injunctions in 
order to also recognize the relative validity of their truth claims; 5) researchers must 
align their chosen injunctions with the experiences they are attempting to enact, 
bring forth, or disclose so as to avoid slippage; and, 6) as a discipline, we must begin 
to value and honor the relative contributions of a wider range of methods and their 
associated operations in order to fully capture the complexity of the constructs we 
study. Integral Methodological Pluralism (and the AQAL model) offers one framework 
through which we can deepen our understanding of and approach to science and its 
application within the criminological endeavor. Meta-frameworks like IMP can fully 
accommodate both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and they also are 
considerably broader in terms of the kinds of methods that are deemed viable and 
appropriate, across and within domains/zones.  
One question that may be raised is “how does IMP relate to what is presently 
being touted as multi-methodological or mixed methods?”. Many of the current 
models, while they do promote the use of more than one operation or method, do 
not represent what we consider to be mixed methods. From an IMP framework (see 
Fig. 1 above), to be truly mixed methods would require working across multiple 
zones, and ideally also including both inside and outside views. Much of what is being 
presented as mixed methods in the current criminological literature employs multiple 
operations, but very often from the same zone, usually zone 6. If they are methods 
from multiple zones, the range is still often restricted to a mixing of only right 
side/exterior zones, without bringing in the interiors. Or, if we do see a mixing of 
interior and exterior (Left side and Right side zones), the strong tendency is to 
include only the outside views (zones, 2,4,6,8). This latter approach is certainly a Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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deeper view, but still does not capture the full or adequate depth, as all inside views 
are left out.  
Again, the single biggest contributing factor to this methodological miasma is 
the predominant, modernist view of science, which is shallow and narrow. This 
ideology
4 of science forces us into a highly constricted view of what can be 
considered viable and valid methodologies. As a result, rich and deep constructs are 
forced through this “sieve of legitimate science” and what often comes out is only the 
conceptual dust; the meat and marrow are left behind. In order to move beyond the 
current dilemma with construct validity, we will need a model for a broader and 
deeper science; we will need an Integral meta-framework. Integral Methodological 
Pluralism derives from an Integral view of science. 
  Generally speaking, the Integral view of science consists of the three strands 
of valid knowing (injunction, apprehension, communal checking). In discussing 
Integral Science, Wilber (1983, 1998, 2000c, 2006a) has distinguished traditional 
and higher science, narrow and broad science, and shallow and deep science. Narrow 
(or shallow) science is what we often call “the hard sciences,” such as biology, 
chemistry, and physics. It is based mostly on the exterior, physical world and 
restricts its use of the three strands to sensory experience only. Broad science, on 
the other hand, relates to “experience in general (sensory, mental, spiritual);” it 
applies the three strands to all direct experience and evidence. The broad or deep 
sciences are sometimes referred to as the human or social sciences, which attempt 
to apply a “scientific” approach to the study of human consciousness/development. 
Unfortunately, there has been some confusion between the “two sciences,” in that 
                                                 
4 We use the concept of ideology here intentionally to capture the notion set forth by Cronbach and Meehl  
(1955), in their seminal assessment of construct validity, when they said that  “[C]onstruct validity is not to 
be identified solely by particular investigative procedures, but by the orientation of the investigator” (p. 
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the human sciences very often “merely ape” the narrow sciences in their methods, 
which is of course problematic (Wilber, 1998, 2000c). 
          It is narrow science that is the disaster of modernity, the bulldozer that 
created the Flatland. Modern empirical science erroneously rejected the interiors, 
simply because they could not be seen by focusing the three strands only on the 
sensory. However, the interiors are accessible, but to broad or deep science, not to 
narrow. They are accessible through the appropriate interior methodologies, but 
cannot be validly viewed via exterior methodologies. They cannot be collapsed into 
exteriors and maintain their true depth of structure or meaning. Adopting an Integral 
meta-framework would provide the foundation and structure for the development of 
a broad science of all quadrants/perspectives, a deep science of both interiors and 
exteriors, a science that honors inside and outside views of all domains without 
privileging one over any other. We need a broad and deep science that can “…guide 
our search of each domain, without the necessity to deform one domain to make it 
‘compatible’ with the others.” Also, “the three strands of deep science separate the 
valid from the bogus in each quadrant…” The adoption of deep science 
“…simultaneously gives to empirical science its nonnegotiable demand that the 
scientific method be employed for truth accumulation, yet also relieves narrow 
science from its imperialism by pointing out that the scientific method can apply as 
fully and as fruitfully to broad empiricism.” It allows each domain, its own dignity, 
logic, architecture, form structure and content, while uniting the domains “by the 
thread of direct experience and evidence, a deep empiricism that grounds all 
knowledge in experience and all claims in verifiability” (Wilber, 1998, p. 176). 
 “If criminal justice/criminology is to truly advance in research and analyses, 
we must look to new methods of examination, not simply attempt to do a minimally 
better job at the things we have been doing for almost a century” (Walker, 2007, p. 
556). We “must” move away from our shallow, linear, surface models toward Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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“...methodologies that are more appropriate for the study of complex human 
behavior” (Walker, p. 557).  Williams (1999) dramatically captures the imperative 
nature of the need to shift to new methodologies when he observes that “...existing 
mainstream approaches are virtually bankrupt in their ability to tell us much about 
crime and criminality. We desperately need a new paradigm or new perspectives by 
which to view our subject” (p. 113).  
Of course it must be acknowledged that the move toward a deeper more 
integral science will not totally eliminate slippage. There will always be some gap 
between what we can conceptualize and our abilities to translate that into 
operations/measures. However, working from a more complete and sufficiently 
complex paradigmatic framework will move us closer to operationalizations that 
more fully and deeply represent our constructs and thereby reduce slippage and 
enhance our understanding.  
Truth in Advertising and Criminological Research  
There is one more lens through which we would like to look at the problem of 
slippage and construct validity, to add some more depth to our analysis and to 
provide a slightly different take on the issues. This is a somewhat unusual analytic 
schema, but we believe it helps to further drive home the points made above about 
the implications for slippage and the need to adopt appropriate scientific/research 
frameworks. 
There has been concern over false advertising since humans began to 
exchange goods and services (see Keller, 1996 for a historical overview of truth in 
advertising legislation and regulations). At the core of this longstanding concern is 
the fundamental belief that it is professionally and ethically required that sellers be 
honest about their products so that buyers are not deceived. According to the 
Federal Trade Commission (1983), “certain elements undergird all deception cases.” 
The FTC “…will find deception if there is a representation, omission or practice that is Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer's detriment” (para. 7). There also are federal laws prohibiting “bait 
advertising” and bait and switch practices. Under Sec. 238.2 of CFR Part 238, it 
states that “[No] statement or illustration should be used in any advertisement which 
creates a false impression of the grade, quality, make, value, currency of model, 
size, color, usability, or origin of the product offered, or which may otherwise 
misrepresent the product in such a manner that later, on disclosure of the true facts, 
the purchaser may be switched from the advertised product to another” (FTC, nd, 
italics not in original).  
  The issues surrounding truth in advertising provide an interesting analogy for 
examining the current state of affairs relating to slippage between criminological 
concepts and the operationalization of them.   Given the pervasiveness of slippage 
and given the potential harm that can derive, we must ask ourselves whether we are 
accurately representing our “product” to our consumers, our social institutions and 
society at large. We need to seriously consider to what extent we may be 
“misleading the consumer,” “misrepresenting the product,” and “creating false 
impressions.” We also must recognize that to do so can very well be to the 
“consumer’s detriment.” 
Also, it should be noted that, just as the Better Business Bureau (2012) and 
the FTC have enjoined sellers to practice sound ethics in their enterprises to protect 
against false advertising and other violations of public trust, in criminology, we too 
recognize our ethical responsibilities. Given the high expectations of the discipline 
and also given the gravity of many of the real world issues that we do address, it is 
imperative that we be meticulous and cautious in our research efforts. To this end 
we have developed an extensive and intricate set of ethical guidelines which we are 
“required” to follow in pursuing our research and also in reporting our findings.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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  The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (nd) lists 22 
obligations/requirements for conducting ethical research and being an ethical 
researcher. These requirements cover a wide range of areas relating to the research 
enterprise, and all are important. For the current analysis, the requirements that 
seem to be most salient are those that relate more directly to the reporting of 
findings:  
2. Since individual members of the Academy vary in their 
research modes, skills, and experience, they should acknowledge 
the limitations that may affect the validity of their findings.  
 
3. In presenting their work, members of the Academy are 
obliged to fully report their findings. They should not 
misrepresent the findings of their research or omit significant 
data. Any and all omitted data should be noted and the reason(s) 
for exclusion stated clearly as part of the methodology. Details of 
their theories, methods, and research designs that might bear 
upon interpretations of research findings should be reported. 
(italics added) 
 
  We have identified these two specific ethical guidelines as they hit at the crux 
of the issue of slippage. Given the high levels of slippage found between the 
conceptual and operational definitions reported in the criminological research 
literature, it would seem to be questionable as to whether these two guidelines are 
being consistently satisfied. We believe that the slippage is in fact a serious limitation 
that does affect the validity of the findings and conclusions of the studies that fall 
victim to it. As such, when the findings are presented, there is misrepresentation 
about what was actually measured and what that means about the original 
concept(s) of interest. Of course this further translates into potentially deleterious 
impacts on policy and practices, which then ultimately are based on misinformation 
and misperception. 
  It must be noted that, with this analysis, we are in no way implying that 
researchers in the discipline are willfully adopting and pursuing unethical practices, 
quite the contrary. With very few exceptions, we believe that our discipline is Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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populated with professionals of high ethical character and standards. However, we 
do think that the current dominant ideology of science and the resultant dominant 
paradigms are putting our research efforts on shaky ground in terms of construct 
validity and therefore subsequent truth/value.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  The main purposes of this examination of the issues surrounding slippage and 
construct validity have been threefold: 1) to raise serious questions about the 
ideology of science that permeates and dominates in criminology and to call for an 
expanded and deeper view; 2) to question the utility and viability of continuing to 
rely solely on traditional methods in criminological research; and, 3) to introduce 
new meta-frameworks for science and research in hopes of stimulating movement 
towards paradigmatic change in the discipline.  
John Law (2004) has observed that “...method in social science (and natural 
science too) is enacted in a set of nineteenth-or even seventeenth-century Euro-
American blinkers. This means that it misunderstands and misrepresents itself” (p. 
143). One message that we hoped to impart is that it is critical, for the continued 
health and growth of the discipline, that we undertake a serious and honest appraisal 
of the current (and longstanding) state of affairs as it relates to our view of science 
and our research practices. Williams (1999) lamented our disciplinary stagnation 
noting that “[I]t is one thing for a field to begin the measurement of critical variables 
in a rudimentary fashion; it is entirely another for that field to maintain the same 
level of measurement some fifty years later” (p. 88). Criminology is in a quagmire of 
repetitively “...examining different concepts, using slightly different 
operationalization and propositions, and getting about the same level of variance 
explained” (Walker, 2007, p. 578).   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Truth in Advertising in Criminological Research 
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In examining very similar issues to those raised here, Williams (1999) offers 
this telling commentary. 
How can these things have happened and, once they have 
happened, why is it that we do not simply say our farewells and 
move along? Two major reasons come to mind. First, we have 
maintained the primacy of the same general approaches for so 
long that we rarely question the way they reflect on reality. 
Indeed the extended primacy of the approaches means that we 
have built up a "scientific" language around them that, literally, 
protects them from questioning. Because language contains the 
symbols of thought, as we learn to think in a language it is those 
very linguistic conventions that shackle us. How do I come to 
this conclusion? Because I have frequently heard colleagues 
express the feeling that their data don't really seem to be 
accurate measures of what they are examining, but they 
continue to use them anyway. I have heard students express 
dismay that their experiences don’t match our "objective" reality.  
And finally, I have sat in courtrooms, been in correctional 
facilities and police departments, and talked with "criminals" and 
I can assure you that the secondary data collected in those 
situations do not reflect the actual situations. ….The second 
reason for continuing the status quo is literally that we have too 
much invested in the current epistemology. (p.75) 
   
  In the academy we have been quick to criticize the public and the media for 
“their inaccurate perceptions of the crime problem and for allegedly misinformed 
opinions about crime and criminal justice” (Braswell & Whitehead, 1999, p. 61). It is 
time that we turned such a critical eye on ourselves. As a discipline we are “...still far 
short of explanations that can inform policy” and “reduce crime...” (Walker, 2007). If 
the discipline of criminology is to move effectively through this new millennium, if we 
are to develop into a social science that can meet the needs of a changing and 
complex world, we must alter our perceptions of good science, learn new languages, 
throw off the shackles of convention (and comfort), and adopt new methodologies. 
We must review our investments in the “current epistemology” and decide whether 
they can actually sustain us through the present and into the future. In short, we 
must transform as a discipline. 
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Dimension/ 
Perspective 
Defined as 
prototypical 
element of 
gender 
Label 
  
Sample 
conceptual 
definition 
(From the 
criminological 
literature) 
Sample 
operational 
definition 
(From the 
criminological 
literature) 
Interior 
Individual 
The aspects of 
gender which are 
experienced 
within an 
individual’s own 
psyche 
gender-
identity 
Women’s 
identities as 
partners or 
mothers 
(Kruttschnitt & 
Carbone-Lopez, 
2006) 
In-depth 
interviews with 
individual women 
Interior 
Collective 
Culturally shared 
beliefs about 
gendered beings 
gender-
ideologies 
Media images of 
women (Cecil, 
2007) 
Content-analysis 
of reality-based 
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Exterior 
Individual 
Biological traits 
associated with 
gendered beings 
sex  Observed sex 
(Smith, 
Makarios, & 
Alpert, 2006) 
Sex as recorded 
by police officers 
on citizen contact 
cards 
Exterior 
Collective 
Behaviors or 
activities 
performed by 
gendered beings 
which have 
become 
institutionalized 
within various 
social systems 
gender-
roles 
Structural 
inequality 
between men 
and women 
(Vieraitis, Britto, 
& Kovandzic, 
2007) 
Computation of 
disparity in 
education, 
income, 
employment, and 
occupational 
attainment 
between men and 
women 
 
Table 1: The Quadrants as Framework for Coding Conceptual and Operational    
Definitions of Gender in the Criminological Literature 
 
 